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Disaster-Specific Mechanisms
for Consolidation
Robin J. Effron"
Wihi the past decade, two laige-scale catastrophes--the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, and Hurricane Katina-have been the recent laboratones of new congressional
provisions for the federalization and aggregation ofmass tort claims. In the case of September
1 lth, the litigation has been shaped by the Air Transportation Safe(y and System Stabilization
Act (ATSSSA), an aggregation device that Congress devised specifically to address that
particular catastrophe. The Huricane Katrina litigation has seen the use (and attempted use) of
the Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA), an event jurisdiction device of
general application that Congress established in 2002. Tis Article explores three aspects of
postcatastrophe litigation where the consolidation of cases or the statutes that govern the
consolidation of such cases raise issues about how to think about "disaster litigation" as a
singular category Afier providing a brief summary of the paths of In re September 11 th
Litigation and In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, this Artcle demonstrates that when the
boundaries of federaljuris diction are shaped by reference to events, this affects how cases may
be consolidated particularly with respect to Congress s degree ofspecificity in naming an event
as the organizing principle of jurisdiction, These two federal statutes challenge courts to
consider how closely, as a matter of law, federal jurisdiction based on the ATSSSA and the
M4M-TJA and the consolidation of cases must be linked under these respective statutes. The
Article then turns to a discussion of the role that courts of appeals play in determirnig the
boundaries offederaljurisdiction and consolidation for chsaster litigation. The Article ends with
a discussion of the practical and administradve concerns of consolidated disaster litigation. I
argue that the September 11 th andCanal Breaches cases show that there can be a problem for
judges and litigants of sorting common from uncommon issues in the context of a district-wide
consolidation organized around an event.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has brought changes to the world of complex
litigation. Congress has introduced several new tools to aid in the
contouring of aggregated claims, such as the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005 (CAFA)' and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act
(MMTJA).2 In addition to the typical mass tort cases that populate the
world of complex litigation,3 two large-scale catastrophes-the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita-have been the recent laboratories of these new provisions. In
the case of September 11 th, the litigation has been shaped by an
aggregation device that Congress devised specifically to address that
particular catastrophe. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the litigation
has been shaped by recent congressional innovations of aggregation
devices that were intended for a more general application.
Disaster litigation is a multidistrict and interjurisdictional problem.
This is because catastrophes can appear at once to be both intensely
local and national in character, triggering questions of the jurisdiction
of federal and state courts.' A disaster does not respect state or other
jurisdictional boundaries, thus it implicates the law and enforcement
mechanisms of multiple states. Finally, the damage and destruction
that a disaster leaves in its wake predictably produces a large number
of lawsuits. The question is, then, is there something about disaster
litigation that makes it unique? In In re September 11th Litigation and
In re Katrna Canal Breaches Ligation, these two disasters each have
been used as the organizing principle for coordinating disparate tracks
1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116
Stat. 1826 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3. Typical mass tort cases include collective personal injury actions, mass financial
injuries, products liability, and pharmaceutical liability cases. See Deborah R. Hensler, The
Role of Multi-Dist'cting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON
HALL L. REV. 883, 887-88 (2001) ("What distinguishes mass torts from ordinary high volume
civil litigation is that they are pursued in a collective fashion-that is, as groups of cases
rather than individually.").
4. See Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization,
44 DEPAUL L. REv 755, 779-86 (1995) (discussing the problems of federalizing mass tort
litigation, primarily in the context of products liability cases).
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of litigants and claims before a single judge in a single judicial district.
This ad hoc district-wide consolidation might be the future of
multidistrict litigation for disasters.
Multidistrict litigation problems are not unique to disaster
litigation. Lawsuits that are litigated as class actions or multidistrict
litigations spring from sources beyond the world of catastrophic
events. Cases that can be and are filed in both state and federal courts
across several jurisdictions present organizational difficulties for
litigants and judges alike. These issues appear in disaster litigation
cases just as predictably as in other mass torts because the challenges
of coordination are inherent in complex litigation. When federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a group of cases, it is
possible for Congress to develop mechanisms for consolidating and
coordinating individual actions. When federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction, complete consolidation is not possible and
coordination is, at best, informal and ad hoc.
Subject matter jurisdiction thus seems to be the natural portal
through which all plans for comprehensive coordination and
consolidation must enter because there is no mechanism for joinder or
consolidation of cases that are litigated in parallel court systems.
When federal subject matter jurisdiction is broadened, particularly to
grant a federal forum for the litigation of state law claims, this
jurisdictional expansion raises a host of concerns about the scope of
the role of federal courts in a system with multiple sovereigns The
power to consolidate like cases is only one of these concerns.
Consider the motivations for CAFA and the MMTJA, contempora-
neous statutes that share the important feature of expanding federal
jurisdiction by loosening the diversity requirement. The former
emphasizes a concern that state court jurisdiction resulted in a
substantive "unfairness" due to application of state law and procedure,6
whereas the latter seems, at least initially, to have been born out of a
procedural frustration with the inability to consolidate litigation in a
single forum.7 Both concerns have taken an increasingly prominent
role in the debates over how Congress should shape the subject matter
5. For a review of the history and literature of this debate, see Barry Friedman,
Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts,
104 COLUM. L. REv. 1211, 1217 n.12 (2004).
6. H.R. REP. No. 107-14 (2001); see Stephen B. Burbank, The ClassAction Fairness
Act of 2005 in Historical Context- A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming
2008).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 107-685, at 199-202 (2002) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1120,1151-53.
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jurisdiction of the federal courts. The litigation arising out of
September 11 th and Hurricane Katrina illuminate how some of these
concerns have been born out.
This Article catalogues the formal and informal mechanisms that
have been deployed to coordinate or consolidate cases litigated in the
aftermath of a disaster. I have selected three aspects of postcatastrophe
litigation where the consolidation of cases, or the statutes that govern
the consolidation of such cases, figure prominently in the category of
"disaster litigation." These issues involve the tasks associated with
consolidated cases before a single judge and the issues surrounding the
interaction of that judge with other courts. Part II gives a brief
introduction to the cases arising out of September 1 th and Hurricane
Katrina. When the boundaries of federal jurisdiction are shaped by
reference to events, this affects how cases may be consolidated,
particularly with respect to Congress's degree of specificity in naming
an event as the organizing principle of jurisdiction. In Part III, I
suggest that both the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act (ATSSSA)8 and the MIMTJA challenge courts to
consider how closely, as a matter of law, federal jurisdiction based on
the ATSSSA and the MMTJA and the consolidation of cases must be
linked under these respective statutes. Part IV discusses the role that
courts of appeals play in determining the boundaries of federal
jurisdiction and consolidation for disaster litigation. Finally, Part V
considers the problem of sorting common from uncommon issues in
the context of a district-wide consolidation organized around an event.
II. USING FEDERAL STATUTES To DEFINE THE SCOPE OF SUBJECT
MAITER JURISDICTION
Congress appears to be increasingly willing to grant federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising out of a
catastrophic event in which multiple parties suffer extensive harms.
This grant of subject matter jurisdiction, which I have previously
labeled "event jurisdiction,"9 could be fashioned to cover a number of
different types of events, but it is in the realm of postdisaster litigation
that Congress has been the most proactive in utilizing this
jurisdictional tool. Event jurisdiction denotes "Congress's choice to
give the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over an 'event' of
8. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note
(Supp. IV 2004)).
9. Robin J. Effron, Event Junsdicton and Protective Coordinaton: Lessons from
the September 1lth Li'gadon, 81 S. CAL. L. RE. 199, 231-36 (2008).
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perceived national importance, rather than locating subject matter
jurisdiction over a certain class of cases or type of claim."'" Two such
event jurisdiction devices have been used in the Canal Breaches and
September 11th cases, although consolidation of disaster-related
claims probably does not require such a device. The September 1 Ith
litigation has been shaped by the use of the ATSSSA, an event
jurisdiction statute that was created specifically to shape jurisdiction
over September 11 th claims. The consolidation of the Canal Breaches
cases of the Hurricane Katrina litigation, on the other hand, was
accomplished by administrative decisions of the judges in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana."
Additionally, the Canal Breaches cases have seen the use (and
attempted use) of the MMTJA, an event jurisdiction device of general
application that Congress established in 2002.
Because the ATSSSA and the MMTJA provide a federal forum
for cases, they also enable courts to consolidate cases for which there
would not have been another basis for federal jurisdiction. In the case
of the ATSSSA, Congress itself identified a distinct class of cases and
litigants and has directed them to a specific forum.'2 I have called this
phenomenon "protective coordination'" and it is the strongest form of
the methods that Congress employs for tying cases together for
litigation purposes. 3 Although the MMTJA does not contain the
mandatory jurisdictional features of the ATSSSA, it too is a form of
protective coordination because "it demonstrates a congressional will
to shape the course of certain litigation according to particular federal
interests."'"
The ATSSSA and the MMTJA represent two approaches to
achieving protective coordination for disaster litigation through the
federalization of forum. The ATSSSA singles out a specific event that
has already occurred for federal jurisdiction.'5 The MMTJA describes
the type of event that gives rise to federal jurisdiction, should the
parties file in or remove to a federal forum.'" As the examples of the
September 11 th and Hurricane Katrina litigations will show, a statute
10. Id. at 202.
11. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
12. ATSSSA § 400(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 241.
13. Effron, supm note 9, at 241-49. Congress has established several methods for
tying cases together for litigation purposes. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (multidistrict
litigation); id. §§ 1404, 1406 (transfer of venue); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions).
14. Eflron, supra note 9, at 242.
15. ATSSSA § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 240-41.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (Supp. v 2005).
2008] 2427
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of this sort is not necessary to achieve a district-wide consolidation of
disaster cases. However, the application of such statutes can shape the
scope of the cases that are available for litigation in a federal forum as
well as the boundaries of the consolidation.
Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York and Judge Stanwood R. Duval, Jr. of
the Eastern District of Louisiana are pioneering the practice of ad hoc
district-wide consolidation of cases relating to a major disaster. The
examples of these two litigations show the evolution of a litigation
group consolidated for pretrial purposes without the involvement of
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML).' Both of these
consolidations were achieved "internally" within the district. The
September 11th cases were filed in or removed to the Southern District
of New York pursuant to the ATSSSA and consolidated before Judge
Hellerstein by operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) and
the local rules of the Southern District. The Canal Breaches cases
were filed in or removed to federal court pursuant to several available
avenues for subject matter jurisdiction. They were then consolidated
before Judge Duval by a decision of the en banc Eastern District of
Louisiana court or transferred to Judge Duval from another district
using 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the transfer of venue statute.'8
A brief summary of these two groupings shows the procedural
prerequisites for placement of such cases in a federal forum, the
mechanisms used to consolidate the cases before one judge, and the
organizational techniques employed to manage disparate subgroups of
cases within the consolidation.
A. The September 11 th Cases
The cases arising out of the events of September 1 th have been
consolidated before Judge Hellerstein in the Southern District of New
York. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in 2973
deaths as well as personal injuries and extensive harm to property and
the environment.'9 Aware that this sort of damage would result in a
large number of high-profile lawsuits, Congress passed a statute eleven
days after the attacks to address these litigation concerns.2 The
17. For a description of the role of the JPML in consolidating multidistrict litigation,
see Effion, supra note 9, at 236-40.
18. See note 58 and accompanying text.
19. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 311 (2005).
20. SeeATSSSA Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230.
[Vol. 82:24232428
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ATSSSA was intended to provide swift compensation to September
l1th victims while shielding the airline and other industries from
potentially crippling lawsuits.2' The statute established an administra-
tive remedy and a federal cause of action. The administrative remedy,
called the September llth Victim Compensation Fund (VCF)22
provided a source of no-fault compensation to the tragedy's victims
and victims' families." The federal cause of action allowed victims to
elect to pursue the traditional litigation option instead by creating a
federal cause of action "for damages arising out of the hijacking and
subsequent crashes of American Airlines flights 11 and 77, and United
Airlines flights 93 and 175, on September 11, 2001."" Section
408(b)(3) gave the Southern District of New York "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including
any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from
or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11,
21. See Effron, supra note 9, at 201, 225.
22. ATSSSA §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. at 237-41.
23. For a more detailed account of the VCF, see generally Symposium, Alter
Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the Future of Civil Justice, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 205 (2003). For further discussion, analysis, and criticism of the VCF, see
generally Robert M. Ackerman, The September llth Victim Compensation Fund- An
Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 135 (2005);
Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master." Undermining the
Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 1
(2006); Richard P. Campbell, Implementing September 11 Victim Compensation Fund: Two
Steps Forward One Step Back, 69 DEE. COuNS. J. 409 (2002); Martha Chamallas, The
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund" Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury
Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51 (2003); Wendy Floering, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of2001: A Better Alternative to Litigation, 22 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 195 (2002); Tracy Hresko, Restoration and Relief- Procedural Justice and the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fung 42 GONZ. L. REv. 95 (2006); Linda S. Mullenix,
The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World Trade Center Victim
Compensation Fund 53 EMoRY L.J. 1315 (2004); Jessica Ramirez, The Victims
Compensation Fund A Model for Future Mass Casualty Situations, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 283
(2002); George Rutherglen, Distributing Justice: The September 1 1th Victim Compensation
Fund and the Legacy of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 673
(2005); Joe Ward, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund- The Answer to Victim
Relief, 4 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 161 (2003); James C. Harris, Comment, Why the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund Proves the Case for a New Zealand-Style Comprehensive
Social Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1367 (2006); Edin G. Holt,
Note, The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund Legislative Justice Sui Genenis, 59
N.YU. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 513 (2003); Jonathan D. Melber, Note, An Act of Discretion:
Rebutting Cantor Fitzgerald Cntique of the Victim Compensation Fund, 78 N.YU. L. Rev.
749 (2003).
24. ATSSSA § 408(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 240-41.
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2001'25 Finally, the statute implemented a liability cap by limiting
26
recovery in all actions to the defendants' available liability insurance.
The September 11 th litigation is not a unitary group of cases. In
a recent article, I documented how a group of cases that were initially
believed to be a relatively coherent group of claims, In re September
11th Litigation, in fact became the umbrella term for a two-part
disaster litigation, a three-part mass tort litigation, and an insurance
battle.28
Most cases filed in the immediate aftermath of September 1 th
were allegations of personal injury, wrongful death, or property
damage suffered on September 1lth itself. The first months of the
litigation were spent coordinating the proceedings pending before
Judge Hellerstein with the proceedings of the VCE The remaining
litigants included insurance companies that provided liability insurance
for Silverstein Properties (the owners of the World Trade Center) and
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ); litigants
with claims of wrongful death and personal injury who had elected not
to enter the VCF, including a number of personnel involved in the
rescue and clean-up effort who had begun to file claims alleging
respiratory injury; and property damage plaintiffs.29 Each group of
cases has presented issues that are unique to that group alone.
The respiratory injury cases have been among the most
challenging for the court. These claims have been brought by workers
who were employed in construction or clean-up efforts at Ground Zero
and claim that the City of New York, along with private contractors,
25. Id. § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 241.
26. Id. § 408(a), 115 Stat. at 240. Although this statutory provision is not juris-
dictional in the same sense as the establishment of the federal cause of action and the grant of
original jurisdiction to the Southern District of New York, I have previously argued that the
liability cap functioned as a jurisdictional feature because it effectively tied the cases together
by means of a "fixed pot" of recovery. See Effron, supra note 9, at 249.
27. The cases were officially consolidated pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P 42(a).
28. Because I have written a detailed account of the September 1 1th litigation
elsewhere, see Effiron, supra note 9, at 203-21, I will confine this discussion to a few key
aspects of the litigation as it has developed from 2001-2007. One significant development
has occurred since that article went to press: the judge had set a trial date for damages only in
a select number of the personal injury/wrongful death cases. These cases have since settled,
see In re September 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,2007) (order regarding
settlement), perhaps due to an evidentiary ruling that Judge Hellerstein made in limine that
did not favor the plaintiffs. See In re September 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 16, 2007) (order regarding defendants' motion in limine).
29. Effron, supra note 9, at 206. A few miscellaneous cases also remained. See, e.g.,
Grosshandels-und Lagerei-Berufsgenossenschaft v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 435 E3d
136, 137-39 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court decision that German insurers cannot
pursue state law tort claims on behalf of victims who have received VCF benefits).
[Vol. 82:24232430
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were negligent in providing proper masks and equipment to protect the
workers from hazardous dust at the site.3" The issues of causation, the
scope of discovery, and the identity of the defendants were sufficiently
different from the personal injury/wrongful death cases; therefore,
Judge Hellerstein created a separate master calendar number for
them." One of the major difficulties in this case is the question of
federal jurisdiction over these claims under the ATSSSA, and how far
it extends.32
The district court held that the ATSSSA grants a federal forum to
the September 11 th cases by creating a federal cause of action.3 The
boundary issues over the exact scope of the federal forum have been a
defining feature of the litigation, particularly with respect to the
respiratory injury cases. Workers alleging to have suffered respiratory
injuries at the World Trade Center (WTC) site began filing their
lawsuits in New York state court in early 2002,"' but the bulk of these
claims were not filed until 2004. The defendants removed the cases to
the Southern District of New York claiming federal jurisdiction under
the ATSSSA.3 ' The plaintiffs then moved to remand, arguing that their
injuries did not arise out of the events of September 11 th within the
meaning of the statute.
The court held that "claims for respiratory injury based on
exposures suffered at the World Trade Center site between September
11, 2001 and September 29, 2001 'arise out of,' 'result from,' and are
'related to' the attacks of September 11, 2001" because they involved
the official search and rescue effort. 7 All other claims alleging injuries
that occurred after this period were remanded to state court because by
September 29, 2001, the task of searching for the living had "officially
30. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 E Supp. 2d 357, 361 (S.D.N.Y.
2003), affd in part, 414 E3d 352 (2d Cir. 2005).
31. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y Feb.
13, 2003) (order establishing master docket).
32. Effi'on, supra note 9, at 210-12.
33. Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(1), 115 Stat. 230, 240-41 (2001) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. IV 2004)).
34. Hickey v. City of New York, No. 02-CIV-8434 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 22, 2002).
35. In re World Trade Ctr Disaster Site Litig., 270 F Supp. 2d at 360.
36. Id. Judge Hellerstein had already ruled that ordinary workplace accidents that
occurred after September 11, 2001, were not a sufficient basis of federal jurisdiction. See
Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F Supp. 2d 345, 347-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Spagnuolo v. Port
Auth., 245 F Supp. 2d 521, 522-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also EffMon, supra note 8, at 208-15
(discussing the respiratory distress cases).
37. Inre World Trade Ctr Disaster Site Litig., 270F Supp. 2dat 361.
2008] 2431
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ended and workers' efforts were focused on... clean-up of the World
Trade Center site."38
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit disagreed, opining:
As it requires no great stretch to view claims of injuries from
inhalation of air rendered toxic by the fires, smoke, and pulverized
debris caused by the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11 as
claims 'relating to' and 'arising out of' those crashes, we conclude that
Congress intended ATSSSA's cause of action to be sufficiently
expansive to cover claims of respiratory injuries by workers in sifting,
removing, transporting, or disposing of that debris.39
The Second Circuit did not, however, define the exact boundaries of
the statute. "No doubt there will be some claims whose relationship to
the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, is 'too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral' to warrant a finding that those claims
'relat[e] to' those crashes; but we make no attempt to dmw a definitive
line here.40
Following the Second Circuit opinion, Judge Hellerstein issued
an order extending jurisdiction to all cases covered by the reasoning of
the Second Circuit.4 Since that time, the district court has begun to
oversee the organization of claims and discovery, and has ruled on
some motions by the defendants concerning sovereign immunity. The
problems of the jurisdictional boundaries, however, remain unsolved.1
2
Workers from the buildings and areas surrounding Ground Zero
and scattered throughout lower Manhattan have filed respiratory
distress claims. As with the original "on-site" plaintiffs, the "off-site"
claimants filed in state court and the defendants removed the cases to
federal district court under the ATSSSA. Because a good deal of these
plaintiffs alleged to have worked both on and off the WTC Site, Judge
Hellerstein created two further master calendar docket numbers, one
for the "off site" plaintiffs and one for the mixed or "straddler"
38. Id. at 372.
39. InreWTC Disaster Site, 414 E3d 352, 377 (2d Cir. 2005).
40. Id. at 380 (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)).
41. In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July
22, 2005) (order following appellate remand extending jurisdiction).
42. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14705, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2005) ("Should a time arise when subject matter
jurisdiction again might challenged ... there will be opportunity again to re-visit the issue
.....)
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plaintiffs who alleged having worked on and off the site.43 The district
court has not yet ruled on the boundaries of the subject matter
jurisdiction of these claims. At present, the parties are proceeding as if
subject matter jurisdiction exists and have drafted master complaints
and case management orders similar to those used by the "on site"
claimants."
Plaintiffs alleging property damage comprise another track of
cases in the September 1 th litigation. Judge Hellerstein assigned
these plaintiffs a separate master calendar number in March 2005 after
realizing that issues of damages and the attendant differences in
discovery meant that these cases would not mirror directly those of the
personal injury/wrongful death plaintiffs. 5 Moreover, the property
damage plaintiffs themselves defy a single categorization. Several
claimants allege damages from the collapse of the building 7 World
Trade Center (7WTC). This was the only building to have collapsed
without being directly hit in the attacks.46 This fact creates substantial
differences in the arguments concerning causation and duty of care.47
In a further layer of complexity, the City of New York maintained their
Office of Emergency Management in 7WTC, prompting a round of
motions and limited discovery concerning the issue of sovereign
immunity.4
8
Another track of cases concerns a dispute among the liability
insurers.4'9  The court has had to determine the extent of liability
insurance coverage based on "binders" and completed insurance
contracts." Judge Hellerstein decided that resolution of the insurance
dispute was integral to administration of the underlying cases.'
43. See In re Combined World Trade Ctr. & Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 103 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y Mar. 28, 2007) (case management order no. 1).
44. Effron, supra note 9, at 215.
45. Id. at 218.
46. Id
47. Id. at 219.
48. Id at 218-19.
49. Ordinary disputes between insureds and property insurers did not come to Judge
Hellerstein because they were not brought pursuant to the ATSSSA. In fact, many of these
cases were filed in and remained in state court. Id. at 216 n.81.
50. Shortly before September 11 th, ownership of the WTC had changed hands. See
id at 216 n.82.
As is typical in large real estate transactions, Silverstein (the new owner) sought
insurance coverage for the property that was not finalized until after the deal had
closed. The process of obtaining liability insurance was further delayed by the fact
that the WTC had been owned and operated by the PANYNJ, an entity that enjoyed
sovereign immunity due to its status as an intergovernmental agency. Therefore,
the premises did not have a liability record and the insurance broker had difficulty
2008] 2433
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The diversity among the claimants, groups of claimants, and
causes of action within the September 1lth litigation came as a
surprise to the judge and the litigants." As I have previously argued,
the situation is symptomatic of thinking about an event as the
organizing principle for litigation. 3
B. The Huricane Karina Canal Breaches Cases
I now turn to the In re Katrina Canal Breaches Ligation as
another example of litigation consolidated in one district with an event
as the organizing principle. The Canal Breaches cases are one of the
larger examples of an ad hoc district-wide litigation. Unlike the
September 11 th litigation, there was not a statute giving a specific
district original jurisdiction, thereby effectuating consolidation.
Consolidation occurred, instead, through a process of assignment by
the en banc court of the Eastern District of Louisiana and § 1404
transfers of venue from other districts. Consolidation has not been the
only method for aggregation of claims. Both federal and state class
action law suits have been a major vehicle for the aggregation in the
obtaining bids from prospective insurers without this data. n re September 11
Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 458 F Supp. 2d 104, 108-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). In such
transactions, the insurers issue a "binder" to the insured that contains the typical
and anticipated state-specific clauses for the property and risks to be insured. The
parties then continue negotiations and the final policy is issued a few months later.
Another feature of a large real estate transaction is the insurance "tower," that is,
the entity is insured by one large primary policy, and then is insured for additional
sums by layers of excess insurers. Silverstein secured a primary and secondary
"umbrella" policy from Zurich American Group (Zurich) and eight layers of excess
insurance involving as many as twenty insurers above that. The aggregate policies
totaled $1 billion in coverage. The primary policy was a $2 million per occurrence,
$4 million aggregate, and the Zurich umbrella covered $50 million per occurrence
in excess of the primary policy.
Id. at 216 n.83 (citations omitted).
51. See id. at 217 ("[T]he [district] court realized that it would have to make several
purely hypothetical findings about the extent of coverage in the absence of clear contours of
the underlying litigation and sought to avoid making such speculative rulings. On the other
hand, the ATSSSA had linked the resolution of the underlying litigation inextricably to the
limits of the available liability insurance coverage. The course of the litigation and the
possibility of reaching any sort of settlement will depend on knowledge of the available pool
of insurance. These issues remain largely unresolved." (footnote omitted)).
52. See id. at 204-05.
53. See id. at 234-35.
54. The Canal Breaches Litigation is not the totality of the Hurricane Katrina
litigation. Many individual cases are pending before judges in federal and state courts
throughout Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Moreover, other consolidations exist in this
context, for example the Mississippi insurance cases before Judge L.T. Senter, Jr., in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, and the oil spill cases
before Judge Eldon E. Fallon, in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
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Canal Breaches cases and for other lawsuits arising out of Hurricane
Katrina."
The Canal Breaches litigation began with suits filed in the
Eastern District of Louisiana, or suits filed in state court and removed
to the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that damage caused by
the canal breaches was the result of negligence. 6 The CanalBreaches
cases consist of both individual actions and class actions.
After the first case was assigned to Judge Duval the en banc court
of the Eastern District of Louisiana determined that "the proper
approach would be to consolidate all such filings for purposes of
pretrial discovery and motion practice.'"" Thus, other like cases were
transferred to his docket from within the Eastern District as well as
from other district courts. 9  Just as Judge Hellerstein and the
September 1 1th litigants initially thought that a general "In Re
September 1 1th" caption would be a sufficient description of the
litigation, Judge Duval and the Canal Breaches litigants thought that
the Canal Breaches litigation would function more or less as a unitary
group under the heading "In re Katrina Consolidated Canal Breaches
Litigation." In fact, in its earliest iteration, the consolidated cases were
simply titled with the caption of the lead case Berthelot v Bob
Brothers Constnjcton."
In late March of 2006, Judge Duval proposed that the cases
should be grouped by levee (17th Street Canal, London Avenue Canal,
and the Industrial Canal),6' and soon after that certain cases alleging
damage from the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) should be
55. The class actions themselves are an interesting group of cases from both a
doctrinal and administrative perspective. These issues, however, are not central to the
problems of event-based or disaster-based consolidation of cases.
56. Superseding Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 2007).
57. No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2007) (case management and scheduling order no.
4) (noting that the consolidated litigation includes "approximately 170 separately filed civil
actions, including about four dozen putative class actions" as of March 2007).
58. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 466 E Supp. 2d 729, 733 (E.D. La.
2006), affldin part, vacated in part, InreKatrina Canal Breaches Litig. 495 E3d 191 (5th Cir.
2007), cert. denied sub nom. Xavier Univ. of La. v. Travelers Cas. Prop. Co. of Am., 128. S.
Ct. 1230 (2008), andChehardy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 128 S. Ct. 1231 (2008).
59. Chehardy v. Wooley, No. 05-1140-FJP-CN (M.D. La. Mar. 16, 2006) (order
transferring cases).
60. See Berthelot v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2006)
(order consolidating the MRGO cases for pretrial purposes).
61. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Mar. 24,
2006) (order grouping cases by levee).
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consolidated as well.62 Shortly thereafter, he directed the court and
parties that "all Katrina Canal Breach cases are to be ... consolidated
pursuant to" that order.3
As the Canal Breaches cases accumulated before the court, it
became clear that organizing the cases around the levee breaches was
insufficient for organizational purposes, and he ordered that the cases
be divided into four subcategories: (1) Levee cases, (2) Insurance
cases, (3) MRGO cases, and (4) Responder cases, all falling under the
general caption "In re. Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation."* He also
appointed counsel to the Defendants' Preliminary Master Committee
to represent the dredging interests in some of the MRGO cases,65
foreshadowing a later decision to add a fifth category, dredging, as its
own subcategory.6 The court subsequently added three additional
6716
subcategories: (6) the St. Rita Nursing Home cases, (7) barge cases,"
and (8) Road Home cases. 9 Judge Duval also began to address the
problems posed by class actions, putative class actions, and mass
joinder cases by ordering that all plaintiffs file individually under the
umbrella "Severed Mass Joinder Cases.
70
Although the consolidation of a large number of Hurricane
Katrina cases around the event of the canal breaches before one judge
was an administrative decision of the Eastern District of Louisiana
rather than a statutory mandate from Congress, the Canal Breaches
litigation has also been affected by the MMTJA, a federal event
jurisdiction statute. Congress enacted the MMTJA in 2002. Although
the legislation had been proposed and debated for over three decades,
it was finally passed as part of a growing sense of urgency that mass
62. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Apr. 11,
2006) (order noting limitation of the MRGO cases); Berthelo; No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Apr.
11, 2006) (order consolidating the MRGO cases for pretrial purposes).
63. Sanchez v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., No. 06-2287 (E.D. La. May 1, 2006) (order
consolidating all Katrina Canal Breach Litigation cases).
64. Berthelot v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. July 19, 2006) (case
management order no. 1).
65. Berthelot v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. June 15, 2006) (order
appointing counsel to represent the Preliminary Master Committee at 3).
66. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Oct. 20,
2006) (case management order no. 2).
67. Id.
68. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Sept. 18,
2007) (case management and scheduling order no. 5).
69. Louisiana v. AAA Ins., No. 07-5528 (E.D. La. Sept. 18, 2007) (order
consolidating the Road Home cases).
70. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Mar. 27,
2007) (order requiring plaintiffs to file amended individual complaints).
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catastrophe cases ought to be aggregated and given a federal forum.7
The MMTJA expands federal jurisdiction over mass accidents by way
of a minimal diversity requirement.
In ordinary cases filed in7" or removed to73 federal court, the rule
governing diversity jurisdiction has been interpreted to require that
each named plaintiff must be completely diverse from each defendant
in the lawsuit.4 The MMTJA takes advantage of the broader
constitutional limits of Article III diversity jurisdiction by granting the
district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action involving
minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from a single
accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at
a discrete location. '7 The MMTJA also amends the removal statute to
allow defendants to remove actions that could have been brought under
§ 1369 originally" and if
the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have been
brought, in whole or in part, under section 1369 in a United States
district court and arises from the same accident as the action in State
court, even if the action to be removed could not have been brought in a
district court as an original matter.77
The last major departure from the § 1332 diversity statute is that the
MMTJA omits an amount in controversy requirement.
The MMTJA has been invoked as a basis for removal by
numerous defendants in Hurricane Katrina actions. The district courts
have been reluctant to interpret the statute in a way that would,
essentially, "federalize" the event of Hurricane Katrina in the way that
the ATSSSA federalized the events of September 11 th.
District court judges interpreting the statute in the context of the
Hurricane Katrina litigation have consistently held that Hurricane
71. See 136 CONG. REc. 12,612 (1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); Mullenix,
supra note 4, at 756 n.5; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity:
Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 7, 9 (1986) ("The problem is
the unavailability of any single forum in which to consolidate scattered, related litigation-a
difficulty that is becoming more and more common given the increasing number of complex
tort actions, such as those growing out of mass accidents and product liability claims.").
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
73. Id. § 1441.
74. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267,267-68 (1806).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (Supp. V 2005).
76. Id § 1441(e)(1)(A).
77. Id. § 1441(e)(1)(B).
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Katrina is not an accident within the meaning of the statute."8
Although the defendants who removed the cases have tried to argue
that the storm was a "natural event culminating in an accident"79 in
which more than seventy-five natural persons died, the district courts
have refused to categorize the Hurricane itself as the requisite accident.
Judge Duval held that "Hurricane Katrina was the 'natural event'
under § 1369 that culminated in many accidents,"8 but "that it is
anything but clearthat Hurricane Katrina was an 'accident' within the
meaning of the statute."8' The same conclusion has been echoed by
several other district court judges."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
heard only one MMTJA case. Wallace v Louisiana Citizens Property
Insurance Corp. was a class action brought against property insurers in
Louisiana state court. The defendants removed the case to federal
court on the basis of the MMTJA, arguing that the statute conferred
federal jurisdiction because they were defendants in a case pending in
federal court that arose out of the same accident. The plaintiff's class
moved to remand the case to state court and Judge Marcel Livaudais,
Jr., of the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the motion. 5 The
defendants appealed the decision.8 The appellate courts do not usually
have jurisdiction to hear appeals of district court decisions to remand
cases to state court; however, the court used an exception to the
relevant statute to find jurisdiction and rule on the issue. In order to
do so, it found that the district court had based its decision on
78. See Fidelity Homestead Ass'n v. Hanover Ins. Co., 458 E Supp. 2d 276, 282
(E.D. La. 2006) (noting that "[o]ther Judges in this district agree" with the conclusion that
Hurricane Katrina itself was not an accident within the meaning of the MMTJA).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(4).
80. Flint v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 06-2546, 2006 WL 2375593, at *3
(E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006).
81. Southall v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., No. 06-3848, 2006 WL 2385365, at *5
(E.D. La. Aug. 16,2006).
82. Johnson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins., Co., No. 06-4256, 2006 WL 3627680, at
*4 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2006); Trosclair v. Sec. Plan Life Ins. Co., No. 06-9220, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84100, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2006); Fradella's Collision v. Lafayette Ins. Co., No.
06-7638, 2006 WL 3258332, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2006); Berry v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.
06-4922, 2006 WL 2710588, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2006); S. Athletic Club, LLC v.
Hanover Ins. Co., No. 06-2605, 2006 WL 2583406, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2006); Flint, 2006
WL 2375593, at *3.
83. 444 E3d 697, 698-99 (5th Cir. 2006).
84. Notice of Removal by Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. at 4,
Chehardy v. La. Ins. Comm'r, No. 05-CV-1 162 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2005).
85. See Wallace, 444 E3d at 699-700.
86. Id. at 700.
87. See infa notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
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principles of abstention rather than on a lack of jurisdiction.88 The
court held that the district court had misconstrued these principles
because the statute permits abstention only under § 1369(a) of the
MMvTJA, and the defendants had removed the case to federal court
pursuant to § 1369(b).89 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district
court's remand to state court." With federal jurisdiction upheld, the
case was transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana and
consolidated with the Canal Breaches litigation. Following this
decision, district court judges have continued to hold that the MMTJA
did not apply in cases where defendants identified Hurricane Katrina
as the accident nexus that triggered jurisdiction under the statute."' In
order to distinguish their cases from Wallace, the judges usually note
that the Fifth Circuit reached its decision based on an interpretation of
the abstention provision and not based on a holding of the meaning of
the term accidentwithin the statute.92
When the argument that the Hurricane would be the triggering
event for the MN4TJA failed to gain traction in the district courts,
litigants attempted to narrow the scope by pointing to the levee
breaches as the requisite accident for federal jurisdiction. Following
Judge Duval's dicta in Flint v Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co., that "the levee break is the requisite accident that
caused the death of at least 75 natural persons at a discrete location "' 3
there was reason to believe that the levee breaches would be the
accident nexus upon which MMTJA jurisdiction would hang.
This, however, has also failed to form the basis of MMTJA
jurisdiction. As the first to directly address the levee breach issue,
Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle held that "[a]lthough a levee breach may
constitute an 'accident' consistent with § 1369, Defendant would be
hard pressed to convince the Court that Plaintiffs' action arises out of
88. Wallace, 444 E3d at 700.
89. Id. at 702. The Fifth Circuit held that the part of the MMTJA found in the § 1441
removal statute allowed for supplemental jurisdiction in this situation and that the abstention
principles in § 1369(b) were "not an independent bar to the exercise of jurisdiction over a
case removed pursuant to § 1441(e)(1)(B), as it applies only to the exercise of original
jurisdiction under § 1369(a)." Id.
90. Id at 701-03.
91. Thompson v. Mixon, No. 06-11265, 2007 WL 1550948, at *3 (E.D. La. May 25,
2007); Maestri v. Lafayette Ins. Co., No. 06-4239, 2006 WL 2990120, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct.
16,2006).
92. See Thompson, 2007 WL 1550948, at *3; Maestn, 2006 WL 2990120, at *2.
93. Flint v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. No. 06-2546, 2006 WL 2375593, at *3
(E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006) (distinguishing the Fifth Circuit opinion in Wallace from the facts in
Flint which did not allege any connection to a levee breach).
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ONE levee breach" and because "[t]here were multiple breaches at
several locations [it was] not [a] discrete" location.94 When Judge
Duval ruled on the applicability of the MMTJA to the levee breach
cases, he held that "[b]ecause ... [p]laintiffs ... bring actions arising
out of multiple levee breaches, this precludes the possibility that these
actions arose out of the same 'single accident' in the case in which
the defendant was already a party." He concluded that "[i]nterpreting
the term 'single accident' so broadly as providing for multiple levee
breaches does not coincide with the purposes of the MMTJA." 6 The
result of these decisions is that the cases that fall along a spectrum of
relatedness to the groups of the CanalBreaches litigation will continue
to be litigated in state court.
HI. THE LINK BETWEEN FEDERALIZATION OF FORUM AND
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
As Part II suggests, a coordination of cases arising out of an event
is not a guarantee that the individual cases or groups of cases will be
related in a legally significant way. The ATSSSA and the MMTJA are
statutes that grant a federal forum for cases arising out of a certain type
of event. The ATSSSA was drafted specifically to address problems
that Congress perceived to arise out of disaster litigation." The
MMTJA, too, also targets disaster or catastrophe litigation."  In
addition to the requirement that the litigation be related to a single
accident, the MMTJA requires that seventy-five natural persons die as
a result, not simply that some deaths or injuries occur." As one of the
bill's earlier sponsors emphasized, "the bill was targeted toward
reducing duplicative litigation resulting from serious single accidents,
not toxic torts or products liability claims."'"
These statutes suggest Congress's interest in encouraging the sort
of ad hoc district-wide consolidation of cases described in Part H for
disaster litigation. This Part explains how Congress has chosen
94. Carroll v. Lafayette Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 06-3955, 2006 WL 2663013, at *3 (E.D.
La. Sept. 14, 2006).
95. Case v. ANPAC La. Ins. Co., 466 E Supp. 2d 781, 794 (E.D. La. 2006).
96. Id.
97. See Effion, supra note 9, at 242, 244 (discussing legislative history and
congressional intent of the ATSSSA).
98. H.R. REP. No. 107-14(2001).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (Supp. V 2005).
100. Laura Offenbacher, Note, The Multiparty Multiforum Tial Juris&ction Act:
Opening the Door to Class Action Reform, 23 REV. LING. 177, 190 (2004) (citing 136 CONG.
REc. 12,612 (1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
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federalization of forum as the entryway to consolidation of cases and
questions just how close the link between federalization of forum and
consolidation of disaster litigation cases ought to be.' °
Both the ATSSSA and the MMTJA were drafted with an eye
toward consolidation, yet, nowhere in the plain language of either
statute is consolidation required Despite the absence of an explicit
link between jurisdiction and consolidation, courts considering both
statutes have taken the possibility of consolidation into account in their
opinions granting or denying jurisdiction. This raises a two-part
doctrinal question. The first is whether it is permissible to deny
jurisdiction under either statute because the lawsuit in question would
not be consolidated with other cases. The second, and perhaps
stronger form of the question, is whether a judge who grants
jurisdiction under either statute is required to transfer and consolidate
the case with a larger group of related cases.
The MMTJA does not require an actual consolidation or
coordination of cases once the Act has been applied to grant
jurisdiction. The legislative history, however, consistently links the
federalization of forum with consolidation.'
0 2
When defendants in the Katrina litigation have removed a case to
federal court under the MMTJA, they have usually identified
themselves as defendants in one of the Canal Breaches actions. The
judges considering application of the statute have considered whether a
case actually would be consolidated with this larger group when
deciding whether to find federal jurisdiction under the statute. Judge
Mary Ann Vital Lemmon, for example, referred to legislative history
stating that the purpose of the statute was to "'streamline the process
by which multidistrict litigation governing disasters are adjudicated"'
to conclude that "[t]he narrow jurisdiction under the MMTJA is not
intended to apply to a case where there are not many plaintiffs and
many defendants."'0 3 Judge David Hittner reasoned that "a single case
does not risk a lack of fairness, uniformity, efficiency, and
101. It might be equally plausible to investigate the advantages of consolidation of
cases on a state-wide level. However, because state governments have even less power than
the federal government to acquire jurisdiction over cases pending in other states, I have
bracketed that issue for the purposes of this Article.
102. H.R. REP. No. 107-14, at 4-5 (2001); H.R. REP. No. 106-276, at 7 (1999); 150
CONG. REc. H 1378 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Smith).
103. S. Athletic Club, LLC v. Hanover Ins. Co., No. 06-2605, 2006 WL 2583406, at
*5 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2006) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 107-685, § 11020, as repnntedin 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1120).
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manageability as contemplated by the MMTJA."'"' Judge Carol J.
Barbier was similarly unwilling to find jurisdiction under the MMTJA
when the "[d]efendant does not suggest that this claim should be
consolidated with ... any other claims."" °5 Judges also have used the
fact of consolidation as one way to distinguish the Wallace case, where
the Fifth Circuit overturned the remand of a case to state court.' 6
In each of these cases, the lawsuit was remanded to state court.
The statements about a lack of consolidation, however, appear to be
dicta because the holdings always stressed the fact that the allegedly
related cases did not arise out of the same "single accident" within the
meaning of the statute.0 7 Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that
when a district court considers a motion to remand a case removed to
federal court under a statute like the ATSSSA or the MMTJA, it is
permissible for that court to consider the possibility of consolidation as
one factor favoring the grant of a federal forum.
The stronger form of this question is: Should jurisdiction under a
statute like the ATSSSA or the MMTJA require consolidation? Given
the current status of litigation in the September 11th and Canal
Breaches cases, this question is, for now, purely hypothetical. No
party litigating under either statute has made such a claim, and the
event-based consolidation in each case has been organized by efforts
of the judges and court personnel within each judicial district, not by
pure application of the statute.
It is not inconceivable, however, that a district judge might find
that a case satisfies the requirements of a statute such as the MMTJA
for the purposes of federal jurisdiction but decline to transfer that case
for consolidation with others. This is even more likely to occur when
the statute is structured like the ATSSSA. There, a judge might find
that a case is related to the specific jurisdictional event named in the
statute, but that that case (or group of cases) is not sufficiently related
to other cases (or groups of cases) to justify a transfer. For example, in
the Hurricane Katrina cases, Judge Lemmon speculated that "the
MMTJA could apply in an action by a single plaintiff against two
defendants," but emphasized that this seemed to contradict the
104. Roby v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 464 R Supp. 2d 572,577 (E.D. La. 2006).
105. Southall v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., No. 06-3848, 2006 WL 2385365, at *6
(E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2006).
106. See, e.g., Roby, 464 F Supp. 2d at 577 ("Courts have subsequently distinguished
the facts of Wallace, which involved class action plaintiffs and consolidation with other cases
107. See supm notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
2442 [Vol. 82:2423
MECHANISMS FOR CONSOLIDATION
statutory purpose."' This attitude about the link between the statute
and its purpose might be enough to keep the question as it applies to
the MMTJA in the realm of the hypothetical.
I believe that interpreting the statute to mandate consolidation
would be unwise. As the stories of the September 11th and Canal
Breaches cases have shown, the results of an event-based consolidation
of cases can result in an unexpectedly diverse group of claimants and
causes of action. As I have argued previously, and as others at the
Symposium have suggested,"9 it might not always be optimal to
structure such a large scale consolidation around a single event. The
best solution, then, would be a statutory scheme that allows for
consolidation where judges and litigants believe that a consolidation
would reduce process costs, but that would conserve the ability to
break litigation apart if efficiency so demands.
Drawing broad conclusions about the relative value of statutes
like the ATSSSA and the MMTJA from the anecdotal evidence of the
September 11th and Canal Breaches cases, is at best imprecise.
Aspects of the experiences of the two litigations, however, suggest that
an event jurisdiction statute drafted like the MMTJA has some
advantages over a statute drafted like the ATSSSA. The MMTJA
defines "event" according to a few characteristics."' In contrast, the
ATSSSA singles out a particular occurrence as the event upon which
exclusive federal jurisdiction is predicated."' The flexibility of the
MMTJA definition is preferable."2 When Congress specifies an event
like September 1 th, the question of grouping cases together in federal
court becomes a matter of statutory interpretation, rather than a
functional analysis of which cases are actually related to each other."3
The MMTJA, then, gives a standard for identifying an occurrence as
an "event" whereas the ATSSSA gives a rigid rule.
When Congress names a particular event as the basis for federal
event jurisdiction, it is making a judgment about which cases should
be bundled together for litigation before any cases have even been
108. S. Athletic Club, LLC, 2006 WL 2583406, at *5 (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Alexandra Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional
Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REv. 2369, 2421 (2008).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a), (c) (Supp. V 2005).
111. Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(3) 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 note (Supp. IV 2004)).
112. This should not be read as an endorsement of the content of the MMTJA
definition of event. It is unclear, for example, that the requirement of the deaths of seventy-
five natural persons represents anything more than a political compromise reached in
Congress.
113. See Effron, supm note 9, at 235-36, 247-48.
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filed.'1 4 A judge, on the other hand, has far better access to the realities
of the litigation once cases have actually been filed.' 5 Judges applying
the MMTJA therefore can account for the relatedness of cases in
identifying a particular occurrence as an "event" and defining the
scope of that event within the meaning of the statute. As explained
above, judges in the Hurricane Katrina cases who were asked to find
jurisdiction under the MMTJA were reluctant to do so because the
cases were unlikely to benefit from consolidation with other cases."6
These are judgments based on the realities of existing cases rather than
on an assumption that all litigation generated from an event is bound to
contain sufficient commonalities to warrant consolidation.
Although the flexibility of the MN4TJA may be advantageous, it
may be that an identification of an "event" under the MMTJA would
lead to the same problems of boundary drawing and of over- and
under- inclusiveness that have plagued the September 11th litigation.
Although judges making the determination of an "event" early on in
the stages of a litigation will have more information than Congress had
in drafting a statute like the ATSSSA, it still might be insufficient. For
example, the judge and litigants in the September l1th litigation
thought of the litigation as a unitary group of cases for the first few
years of that litigation."7 For this reason, I retain my earlier skepticism
about the overall wisdom of event jurisdiction statutes."8 As the Canal
Breaches litigation shows, it is possible for judges and litigants to
organize an event-based district-wide consolidation of cases pending
in federal court without the help of any federal statute or directive.
And as the September 11th cases show, federalizing cases arising out
of an event for the purpose of consolidation may create more problems
than it solves. Event jurisdictional statutes, then, are mechanisms to be
deployed with caution. When they are used, they ought to be created
with the maximum possible flexibility for application by judges and
litigants.
114. I have called this the "ex ante" approach and explained in further detail the
problems with this method. See Effron, supra note 9, at 244-46.
115. This argument is about the relative institutional competence of Congress and the
courts to determine issues of consolidation. See Effron, supra note 9, at 245.
116. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
117. SeeEffron, supranote 9, at 204 n.11.
118. Id.
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IV APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE COORDINATION BOUNDARIES
Judges who manage the aggregated claims involved in complex
litigation have broad authority to manage and organize the cases before
them. "9 Like any other type of litigation, however, they are responsible
for implementing the orders of the court of appeals.
One way in which Congress could improve disaster litigation is to
address the relationship between the district courts and the courts of
appeals in determining the scope of the litigation. Congress has tried
to streamline litigation by making available a federal forum in a
broader number of cases. To that end, the district courts hearing
disaster litigation cases have been called upon to tailor the scope of
how many cases may be litigated together in federal court by ruling on
motions to remand cases to state court for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The circuit courts have struggled with appeals from
remand orders, wanting to contribute some finality to the jurisdictional
scope of complex litigation, but often lacking obvious appellate
jurisdiction to do so. Although both the Second and Fifth Circuits
have found creative solutions to the appellate jurisdiction problems,
these tools may not always be available.
The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), plainly states that
a district court's order of remand to state court is not reviewable by the
appellate courts.'2 ° The statute's judicially recognized objective is a
"'policy of not permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of
a removed cause by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of
the district court to which the cause is removed.""
2
'
Congress has carved out an exception to this rule in the class
action context. Section 1453(c)(1) of CAFA states "that notwith-
119. See In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 E3d 700, 712 n.48 (5th Cir. 2008)
("'A district court is given broad discretion in controlling class actions because of the
managerial difficulties which may develop .... ' (quoting Nix v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n
of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1973))); see also Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 391-413 (1982) (analyzing the managerial role of
judges in the litigation process).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000) ("An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of
this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise."); see also Things Remembered, Inc. v.
Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1995) ("As long as a district court's remand is based on a
timely raised defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction-the
grounds for remand recognized by § 1447(c)-a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal of the remand order under § 1447(d).").
121. In re Lowe, 102 E3d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Rice, 327
U.S. 742, 751 (1946)).
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standing section 1447(d), a court of appeals may accept an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to
remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed.""'2
To further streamline the process, the statute sets a date for filing an
appeal,'23 and specifically mandates that "the court shall complete all
action on such appeal, including rendering judgment, not later than 60
days after the date on which such appeal was filed.' 24  CAFA's
legislative history suggests Congress's belief that speedy appellate
review of remand orders or denials would reduce the overall
procedural costs associated with the adjudication of class actions.'
The Senate Report, for example explained that the purpose of this
mechanism "is to develop a body of appellate law interpreting the
legislation without unduly delaying the litigation of class actions."'' 6
These reasons for carving out an exception to § 1447(d) in CAFA
apply to event jurisdiction statutes. As I have shown, event jurisdiction
is likely to be tied to protective coordination, as in the case of the
ATSSSA and the MMTJA where the consolidation of litigation
relating to a certain event is at least one reason for federalization of
forum. The boundaries of consolidation or potential consolidation are
a key aspect of how the given statute will be applied. It is useful, then,
to have direction from the appellate courts about the interpretation and
application of the statute. Without a mechanism like the one built into
CAFA, the availability of appellate review is spotty. The September
1 1th and Hurricane Katrina examples show, for example, that
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (Supp. V 2005). Interestingly, the defendants in Wallace
tried to rely on this section as a basis for appellate jurisdiction because it was, in fact, a class
action that had been removed. Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 444 E3d 697,
699-700 (5th Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, however, because the basis
for removal clearly had been the MMTJA and not CAFA. Id. at 700.
123. See 28 US.C. § 1453(c)(1). This period is the subject of the dispute among
courts and commentators over the meaning of the statutes. By all indications, Congress
meant to establish a seven-day deadline for filing the appeal. Instead, they drafted the statute
to say "no less than seven days," thus effectively creating a waiting period instead of a
deadline. Circuit courts have split over how to interpret and apply this provision.
124. Id. § 1453(c)(2). The court of appeals may extend this period by ten days if it
feels that it is necessary "in the interests of justice," id § 1453(c)(3)(B), or extend it
indefinitely upon agreement of the parties, id § 1453(c)(3)(A).
125. The legislative history of the interlocutory appeal provision of CAFA has been
unusually well-documented by both courts and scholars because of the interpretive difficulty
caused by the odd drafting error. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, "Less" Is 'Mo"?
Textualism, Intentionalism, anda Better Solution to the Class Action Fairness Act Appellate
Deadline Riddle, 92 IowA L. REv. 1183, 1195-1207 (2007) (discussing the various
approaches in statutory interpretation emphasized by courts in interpreting CAFA's appellate
provision).
126. S. REP. No. 109-14, at49 (2005), asrprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,46.
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determining the boundaries of subject matter jurisdiction can be
integral to shaping the litigation when cases are to be consolidated or
federalized using specialized event jurisdictional statutes, and that
appellate review is important to that process.
The Second Circuit confronted the problem of appellate review in
the context of the respiratory injury cases. Federal jurisdiction was
based on the ATSSSA's requirement that the claims arise out of the
events of September 11, 2001, but the fact that many of the claimed
respiratory injuries were gradations of temporal and geographic
distance from this event made the determination difficult.17  The
district court heard the plaintiffs' motion to remand, and struggled to
find a principled basis for drawing a jurisdictional line.' 28 The court
held that "claims for respiratory injury based on exposures suffered at
the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001 and
September 29, 2001 'arise out of,' 'result from,' and are 'related to' the
attacks of September 11, 2001" because they involved the official
search and rescue effort."' All other claims alleging injuries that
occurred after this period were remanded to state court because "[b]y
September 29, 2001, [search and rescue] officially ended and workers'
efforts were focused on ... clean-up of the World Trade Center site."'3
The effect was to deny in part and grant in part the motion to
remand.'3'
Judge Hellerstein believed that the question of subject matter
jurisdiction was so important to how the litigation would proceed that
it called for a higher level of finality. Finding that "[t]he scope of
federal jurisdiction in these cases involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion"
and that an "immediate appeal also may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation" the district court certified the
127. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. Judge Hellerstein had already
determined the outer limits of ATSSSA jurisdiction by ruling that ordinary workplace
accidents that occurred at the WTC demolition site were beyond the scope of federal
jurisdiction. See Graybill v. City of New York, 247 E Supp. 2d 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y 2002)
("Congress did not intend to oust state court jurisdiction in cases such as this involving
injuries common to construction and demolition sites generally, and risks and duties not
alleged to be particular to the special conditions caused by the terrorist-related aircraft crashes
of September I." (emphasis added)); Spagnuolo v. Port Auth., 245 E Supp. 2d 521, 522-23
(S.D.N.Y 2002) (denying a request for interlocutory appeal based on an order remanding a
case to state court).
128. In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F Supp. 2d 357, 368-80 (S.D.N.Y
2003).
129. Id at 361.
130. Id at 372.
131. Seeid.at380.
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issue for interlocutory appeal.'32 Due to the requirements of 28 US.C.
§ 1447(d), Judge Hellerstein could only certify those cases for appeal
for which he had denied the motions to remand.'
33
The Second Circuit agreed that it only had appellate jurisdiction
over those cases in which the district court had denied the motion to
remand, and rejected the argument that it had appellate jurisdiction
based on general appellate review statutes. 13 4 In the end, this led the
Second Circuit to the rather tortured conclusion that it was really only
hearing the cases for which the district court had denied remand. In
reality it was ruling on all of the cases. The Second Circuit held that
the district court erred in remanding to state court the cases alleging
injuries that occurred after September 29, 2001.135 While holding that
"[n]o doubt there will be some claims whose relationship to the
terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, is 'too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral' to warrant a finding that those claims
'relat[e] to' those crashes," it did not identify exactly which cases were
so unrelated to the events of September 11 th that they did not belong
in federal court.'
6
The district court responded by extending jurisdiction to all cases
covered by the reasoning of the Second Circuit.' 37  Since the circuit
court's ruling, however, the district court has received more cases with
more complex relationships to September 11 th, both in terms of time
and geography. To manage the organizational difficulties created by
the uncertainties of subject matter jurisdiction, Judge Hellerstein
created additional "tracks" of cases within the district-wide
consolidation3 ' and is proceeding as if subject matter jurisdiction
132. Id.at381.
133. Id.at380-81.
134. InreWTC Disaster Site, 414 E3d 352, 363-71 (2d Cir. 2005); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291(b) (2000) (providing for appellate review of final orders fitting within the collateral
order doctrine); id § 1292 (permitting some review of interlocutory appeals from nonfinal
orders).
135. In re WTCDisaster Site, 414 E3d at 381.
136. Id. at 380 (quoting N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)). The Second Circuit stated that it would "make
no attempt to draw a definitive line" in this case. Id.
137. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y.
July 22, 2005) (order following appellate remand extending jurisdiction); In re World Trade
Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y July 22, 2005) (order amending
previous order following appellate remand extending jurisdiction).
138. See In re Combined World Trade Ctr. & Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 103 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2007) (case management order no. 1).
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exists."' Should the district court ultimately decide to remand these
cases to state court, the court of appeals would lack jurisdiction to
review the order unless it was another "mixed" order to grant in part
and deny in part.
The Fifth Circuit has also had to find a way around the barrier of
§ 1447(d) to assert appellate jurisdiction over the MMTJA aspects of
the Canal Breaches litigation. As explained above in Part ll.B, the
MMTJA is an event jurisdiction statute that makes an enlarged number
of cases available for litigation in a federal forum, specifically with an
eye toward coordination or consolidation for pretrial purposes.
In Wallace v Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp., the
Fifth Circuit held that § 1447(d) was not a bar to appellate review of
the remand order because the district court remand was based on
abstention, not lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'40 Thus, the court of
appeals had jurisdiction under the 28 U.S.C. § 1291 collateral order
doctrine.'4' Noting that an "'abstention-based remand order does not
fall into either category of remand order described in § 1447(c), as it is
not based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in removal
procedure, '"4 1 2 the Fifth Circuit held that § 1369(b) of the MMvITJA is
an abstention provision that "assumes subject matter jurisdiction under
§ 1369(a), but abstains where the 'substantial majority' of the plaintiffs
and the 'primary defendants' are citizens of the same state and the
claims at issue are 'governed primarily by the laws of that State.
''
"
4 3
The court went on to explain that it was under these abstention
principles that the district court had remanded the class action to state
court.'"
One consequence of this situation is that the appellate courts are
able to insert themselves only haphazardly into the interpretations of
definitions of the scope of these statutes when the underlying decision
fortuitously lies outside of the boundaries of § 1447(d). For the
MMTJA, this means that the court of appeals may have a hand in
defining the proper interpretation of abstention based on a local
controversy, but less so in the interpretation of what sort of event falls
139. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y.
May 13, 2005) (case management order no. 4).
140. 444 E3d 647, 700-01 (5th Cir. 2006).
141. Id at 700.
142. Id (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996)).
143. Id. at 701.
144. Id. at 701-02.
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within the meaning of an "accident" within the statute.'45  For the
ATSSSA (or an MMTJA situation in which the temporal and
geographical boundaries of a single accident are unclear), this means
that the district court will always need to deny, at least in part, a motion
to remand, and stay the actual order of remand in order to obtain
appellate review that would then apply to the original field of cases.
Given this experience of relative difficulty in obtaining appellate
review of event jurisdictional statutes, it is worth considering whether
Congress ought to amend Title 28 to provide for immediate appellate
review of remand orders where subject matter jurisdiction is based on
a statute such as the ATSSSA or the MMTJA. The § 1447(d)
prohibition on most appellate review might, in the end, be causing
more difficulty and delay than the savings of process costs that the rule
is meant to achieve.
As the Senate Report for CAFA noted:
[T]he current prohibition on remand order review was added to section
1447 after the federal diversity jurisdictional statutes and the related
removal statutes had been subject to appellate review for many years
and were the subject of considerable appellate level interpretive law.
The Committee believes it is important to create a similar body of clear
and consistent guidance for district courts that will be interpreting this
legislation and would particularly encourage appellate courts to review
cases that raise jurisdictional issues likely to arise in future cases."'
This logic applies with equal force to statutes like the MMTJA and the
ATSSSA that stand at the intersection of federalization of forum and
consolidation of cases.
V THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGE OF SORTING THE COMMON
FROM THE UNCOMMON
Complex litigation always entails special administrative and
organizational challenges that stem from the difficulties of managing a
multitude of plaintiffs, defendants, and claims. Disaster litigation, to
the extent that it is a type of complex litigation, shares in these
difficulties. There are, however, specific problems that occur in
disaster litigation that is aggregated around a specific event. To
145. Cf Stephen Aslett, Note, Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp.:
The Fifth Circuit Expands Fedeml Junsdiction over State Court Class Actions Ansing Out of
Hurricane Kattina 81 TuL. L. REv. 1331, 1342 (2007) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit failed to
properly analyze the meaning of "accident" within the MMTJA).
146. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 49 (2005), repnintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,46.
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understand this, it is useful to briefly review how cases may be
aggregated in the first place.
Cases that share elements of fact or law do not always share the
level of commonality required for a class action. Cases within one
district may be consolidated by operation of local rules '47 or pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).148  Cases that are pending in
multiple federal judicial districts may be aggregated pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407 as a multidistrict litigation (MDL) for pretrial
purposes.49  These cases involving common questions of fact are
referred by judges or upon motion of the parties to the JPML, which
then decides whether or not to consolidate the cases for pretrial
purposes.' ° Actions consolidated for pretrial purposes by the JPML
are mostly consolidated according to the type of cause of action or a
single occurrence and not arranged around a large event.'5 '
One worry that has arisen in the September 11th litigation as well
as in the Canal Breaches litigation is that individual cases will be
swallowed up by issues of common liability or class certification
issues. 1 2 The general concern is that the interests of individual litigants
will be ignored or underrepresented by lawyers who represent a class
as a whole,' or by leaders of plaintiffs' committees who represent only
147. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. R. 15(a) ("[A] civil case will be deemed related to one or more
other civil cases and will be transferred for consolidation or coordinated pretrial proceedings
when the interests of justice and efficiency will be served. In determining relatedness, a
judge will consider whether (i) a substantial saving of judicial resources would result; or
(ii) the just efficient and economical conduct of the litigations would be advanced; or (iii) the
convenience of the parties or witnesses would be served.").
148. FED. R. Civ. P 42(a) ("When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.").
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000) ("When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.").
150. Id § 1407.
151. See John F Nangle, From the Horse Mouth: The Workings of the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 341, 342 (1999) (explaining that the JPML has
adopted the practice of classifying its dockets into eight general category areas: air and
common disasters, antitrust, contract, employment practices, patent and trademark, products
liability, securities law, and miscellaneous).
152. In reKatrina Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (ED. La. Mar. 3, 2007) (case
management and scheduling order no. 4 at 47-49).
153. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountabiliy Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 384 (2000); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs'AttorneyJ Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis andRecommendations forReform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991).
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a fraction of litigants involved in the case. 5 4 This concern is present in
a unique way in disaster litigation cases.
When such cases have been consolidated for pretrial litigation
purposes, it could be easy to succumb to a "more bang for the buck"
mindset when structuring discovery, or setting a motion or trial
schedule. A primary motivation for consolidating cases is to
economize judicial resources. The temptation, then, might be to think
of common issues of fact or law as "threshold" issues that can or
should be resolved in advance of individual issues of fact or law. A
few examples from the September 11th litigation and the Canal
Breaches litigation demonstrate how a court presiding over
postdisaster consolidated cases confronts and handles these issues.
Some common issues of law can be characterized as genuine
threshold issues. These are primarily the jurisdictional and immunity
issues asserted by the parties that would operate to either dismiss cases
against some defendants altogether or end the litigation of some cases
in the federal forum. Threshold issues, then, are especially appealing
to single out for advanced resolution. In both litigations, definitions of
the jurisdictional boundaries have been the subject of early, and
sometimes extensive, motion practice.
Beyond the obvious threshold issues of immunity and jurisdiction
lie the myriad issues that must be resolved and facts that must be
discovered, any of which might be common to all, some, or just a few
of the parties involved in the consolidated litigation. The problem is
not so much that it is unfair to make parties wait to investigate or brief
an issue that is individual to them while the court resolves issues that
they share in common with others. It is, rather, that parties must wait
while issues that have nothing at all to do with their case are
investigated or resolved. Judge Duval noted this issue in addressing a
discovery issue in the insurance subcategory of the Canal Breaches
litigation. 5 Judge Duval had certified for interlocutory appeal the
issue of his ruling as to the enforceability of insurance policies for
wind and water damage. The Fifth Circuit granted review of the issue,
and issued a stay of the proceedings in the district court while the case
154. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty
and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519,
523-25 (discussing the need for procedural safeguards in class actions to protect absent class
members).
155. For more information regarding Judge Duval's experience with this litigation, see
DVD: The Problem of Multidistrict Litigation: Ad Hoc District-Wide MDLs/MMTJA
(Tulane Law Review 2008) (statements by Judge Stanwood Duval) (on file with the Tulane
University School of Law Library).
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was under review. Some defendants asked the court for a broad
interpretation of the stay, but the court construed the stay narrowly and
insisted that discovery on substantive issues continue in the cases that
did not involve insurance coverage questions, and that discovery on
individual insurance claims that did not involve common liability
would continue. '  In other words, Judge Duval was mindful of this
concern, while also recognizing the plaintiffs' interest in proceeding
toward a swift resolution of the lawsuit. He denied the motion to
bifurcate completely the issue of governmental immunity.' He
instead sought a middle ground in which discovery would be directed
toward that issue, but not completely limited so as not to forestall the
case from proceeding in the event that he found against the defendants
on the immunity issue. "8
Judge Hellerstein has encountered similar issues in the
September 11th litigation. While the court has ruled on several issues
of liability that are common to all or some of the litigants, it has also
pressed forward with resolution of individual claims. For example,
some of the wrongful death cases were stalled due to peculiar
discovery issues pertaining to sensitive government information.'59
The court, in an effort to move the cases forward but also to encourage
settlement, bifurcated the liability and damages aspects of trial and
prepared to try several cases for damages only in autumn of 2007.6' In
other words, the court and the parties decided that in that instance, it
was useful to develop aspects of the individual claims regarding
damages and for the defendants to prepare responses. The process
involved both factual investigation into the individual damage
allegations of each claimant as well as litigation on the admissibility of
some of the evidence.'6' The cases settled shortly before the scheduled
trial,'62 and this may have been a result of both the plaintiffs and
156. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Mar. 16,
2007) (order and reasons clarifying the stay ordered by the Fifth Circuit at 3).
157. In re Katina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig, No. 05-4182 (E.D. La. Mar. 15,
2007) (Robinson case management order no. 1).
158. Seeid.
159. See Effron, supm note 9, at 221-22.
160. In re September 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2007) (order
bifurcating cases and proceeding and trial on damages).
161. The plaintiffs had wanted to admit the evidence of future earning as well as
extrinsic evidence of the events of September 11 th, including photos of the terrorists going
through airport security and the cockpit data recorder. The district court granted the
defendants motion to exclude this evidence from trial. In re September 11 Litig., No. 21 MC
97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007) (order regarding defendant's motion in limine).
162. See discussion supm note 28.
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defendants seeing the reality of the outcome of the damages aspect of
trial.
63
Similar attention has been given to the individual aspects of the
property damage and respiratory injury claimants. Although the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require pleading with
specificity,"64 Judge Hellerstein has used the creation and filing of
master "check box" complaints to encourage some initial discovery
and definition of plaintiff claims.'65 Like the bifurcation of liability and
damages in the personal injury/wrongful death cases, this is meant to
encourage the parties to look beyond some of the threshold issues that
will affect the outcome of each claim.
In at least one instance, the ATSSSA itself was the source of
conflict between the need to address issues common to several groups
of plaintiffs and the needs of individual groups or subgroups. This
arose out of the creation of a partial administrative remedy to claims
arising out of September 11 th. The property damage plaintiffs shared
several issues of causation and discovery with the personal injury and
wrongful death plaintiffs.'66 The personal injury and wrongful death
claimants had access to the VCF, a remedy unavailable to the property
damage plaintiffs. Although the court ruled on preliminary issues of
duty of care and proximate cause on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
standard, "the court and the parties understood that the 'real' work of
moving the litigation forward could not begin until the VCF had closed
and its attendant issues were settled."'
67
The Canal Breaches litigation and the September 11th litigation
thus demonstrate how litigation that is consolidated based on a disaster
or an event within a disaster can create a conflict between common
and individual issues. I do not propose that there is an easy answer to
163. See Lahav, supm note 109, at 2376-79.
164. See Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).
165. See Effiron, supra note 9, at 212.
166. Id. at 217-19. Recall, however, that the property damage plaintiffs were
eventually split off into their own "track" because of a number of issues unique to them. Id.
at 219.
167. Effiron, supra note 9, at 218. The property damage and personal injury/wrongful
death claimants also occasionally clashed because
on several occasions, the property damage plaintiffs expressed concerns that a
high-visibility trial featuring the wrongful death plaintiffs might result in extremely
high jury verdicts, thus cutting deeply into the liability cap; or that some of the
personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs would act as unreasonable 'hold-
outs,' thus preventing a reasonable global settlement plan.
Id This worry is now moot given the recent settlement of the personal injury/wrongful death
cases. See discussion supra note 28.
2454 [Vol. 82:2423
MECHANISMS FOR CONSOLIDATION
this problem, or that the conflict alone dooms a disaster litigation
consolidation to failure. What these examples do show, however, is
that judges and parties ought to be cognizant of these potential
conflicts at two stages of litigation. The first is to be sure that there is a
full accounting of individual issues as well as commonalities when
deciding whether or not to consolidate cases. The second is to remain
continually vigilant of these conflicts as the litigation proceeds and
timelines for discovery, motion practice, and trials are set.
VI. CONCLUSION
Disaster litigation is not a new phenomenon. However, some of
the tools employed to manage it are recent innovations. This is part of
the recent trend toward federalization of forum and even federalization
of some aspects of substantive tort law. It is not clear that
postcatastrophe litigation, in and of itself, presents organizational or
doctrinal problems that are unique to disasters. Rather, it is the use of
event-based consolidation that has generated new administrative
challenges and doctrinal puzzles for the courts. This Article has
highlighted just a few of those issues, but the full scope of the
advantages and disadvantages of event jurisdiction and event-based
consolidation will only become clear afier courts have had many more
years to grapple with the issues-both expected and unexpected.
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